This work does a short inquiry into the past experience of the Italian banking law and the ownership structure of the Italian credit industry. The inquiry is especially focused on the role played by culture and other historical events (e.g. political ones) in shaping the Italian economic framework. In other words, this paper wants to trace a short and descriptive outline of the evolution of the Italian banks" ownership structure in order to show how political and social factors counted in determining the present features of the system.
The role of culture and history in the evolution of systems of capitalism and structures of ownership and control
Culture and history constantly play an important role in the economy 45 . Even more, from the work for which Douglass North was awarded of the Nobel Prize can be learned that culture and history always matter 46 . For instance, it must be always kept in mind that economic incentives are not lonely suitable to drive the world towards efficiency. In other words, it's impossible to change the world just by legislative 45 «By culture we mean the transmission from one generation to the next, via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence behaviours» [R. BOYD 46 «In the modern Western world, we think of life and the economy being ordered by formal laws and property rights. Yet formal rules, even in the most developed economy, make up a small (although very important ) part of the sum of constraints that shape choices; a moment's reflection should suggest to us the pervasiveness of informal constraints. In our daily interactions with others, whether within the family, in external social relations, or in business activities, the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, and conventions. Underlying these informal constraints are formal rules, but these are seldom the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions. That the informal constraints are important by themselves (and not simply as appendages to formal rules) can be observed from the evidence that the same formal rules and/or constitutions imposed on different societies produce different outcomes. (…) Where do informal constraints come from? They come from socially transmitted information and are part of the heritage that we call culture» [D.C. NORTH, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, (1990), p. [36] [37] . reforms aimed to provided such incentives, because they must be followed by a change in people's mind. Moreover, beside the general cultural determinants, also the dominant political attitudes deeply influence the economy 47 (and not always politics coincides with culture). All these elements are part of the concept well known as «path dependence» 48 . For what especially concerns the matter under analysis, it can be noticed that each national ownership and control pattern is the result of the historical evolution of the national economy to which it pertains. However, it must be also said that corporate ownership and control structures never 47 For a wise analysis focused on the American context see (1994) . 48 «Path dependence is a term that has come into common use in both economics and law. In all instances that path dependence is asserted, the assertion amounts to some version of -history matters‖. Path dependence can mean just that: Where we are today is a result of what happened in the past. (…) In biology, the related idea is called contingencythe irreversible character of natural selection. (…) We must caution, however, that the analogies are incomplete. If turtles become extinct, they will not reappear suddenly when circumstances change to make it advantageous to have a shell. But if people stop using large gas-guzzling engines because gasoline has become expensive, or extent patent protection to the -look and feel‖ of software, they can always revert to their old ways if they come to regret the switch» [S.E. MARGOLIS stand alone. On the contrary, every work dealing with corporate governance (included those about the specific topic of national patterns of corporate ownership and control) should start by looking at the matter from a more general perspective.
Taking this perspective, let's start by quoting a prominent scholar. He begins one of his most significant works 49 stating that the word «capitalism» is commonly used for the definition of a particular kind of economic organization traditionally pertaining to Western Europe, North America and Japan. More precisely, he states that this kind of economic organization is normally defined as a system in which the assets are owned by those people who invest their capitals for the production of goods or the providing of services. However, immediately after this first statement, the scholar himself specifies that, in practice, the ownership by investors is only a contingent feature of the free market economies, even if usually dominant. Indeed, in every free market economy (United States included) a number of different ownership structures coexist, involving various kind of owners and having different degrees of concentration.
In few words, claiming that several «systems of capitalism» exist throughout the world only means that different economic organizations sharing the common trait of the ownership by investors as dominant (albeit contingent) feature are in place. Beyond the just mentioned common trait, all the other specific features of firms (even within the same system of capitalism) can vary a lot.
In general, many historical factors, cultural elements and social relations are suitable to affect the way in which an economy is driven and organized. In this respect it must be remarked that, as already said, corporate ownership and control structures don't stand alone. However, the dominant way in which firms are owned and controlled within a certain country seems to be particularly important because it somehow reflects the influence of all the other forces.
According to what explained above, it's possible to say that each single country has its own peculiar system of capitalism 50 Italy is usually considered as a «bank-centred system». This categorization only catches one of the main distinctive features of the Italian capitalism, because it is characterized by many other very specific elements. However, the categorization stresses the important role that, also in Italy, credit institutions played and still play in the economy. As already said, corporate ownership and control structures can't be studied apart from the general economic context in which they have been developed, but they are very important anyhow. In particular, the ownership and control structures of the Italian banks have some specific characteristics that are very interesting to be analysed, in order to highlight how they reflect the impact of many different forces (cultural, historical and political ones) on this kind of institutions.
The primary roots of the current context: some notes about the initial development of a modern credit industry in Italy
Around 1861, the year in which the country was politically unified, the Italian economy was stagnant and still resembling a medieval one from both a financial and an industrial perspective 52 . From a financial perspective, a prominent scholar in banking observes four peculiar features of the post-unitary Italian economy: i) frequent financial crisis in pre-unitary States; ii) the scarcity of a monetary field in the Italian economy (90% of legal tender was hard money); iii) the absence of lending institutions both on long and short term; iv) strong elements of dualism and exposition to usury for a large layer of population 53 . In addiction, any stock exchange in a modern sense was in operation.
From an industrial perspective, it can be noticed that in those years the Italian fabrics were still it's only to specify that there can be an enormous difference between economic borders and the geographical ones. 51 For what especially concern banche popolari, being chartered as cooperatives, the number of shares owned by each single shareholder was limited, thus they can be described as a sort of public companies 67 . More precisely, according to a statistic dated back to that period, the shareholdings of banche popolari was composed for more than 65% by small landowners, farmers, artisans, shopkeepers and local notables or professionals 68 . For what concern banks chartered as corporations, on a total of 226, the 155 biggest ones globally counted 3711 shareholders and the largest part of them was Italian (3540 shareholders). Among them, the 50% were other banks (14.53%) or private bankers (35.47%), while the rest were merchants (9.77%), industrialists and artisans (7.77%), shipowners (6.41%), large landowners (4.81%), stockbrokers (4.22%), and lawyers (2.5%) 69 . The category of private bankers, being the largest one, need to be further explained. They were people whose principal occupation was not banking. In few words they were the evolution of the medieval bankersmerchants, who variously distributed their resources between different activities such as banking and trading 70 . Moreover, among private bankers, as well as among the other categories, many shareholders had more than one occupation, since they could also be noblemen or politicians 71 . Thus the shareholdings of Italian banks during the 1860s and 1870s was quite various and tangled in different activities.
In those years, the role foreign investors was quite limited, since they represent just 231 underwritings (less than 5% of the total) 72 . However, foreign investors played an important role for the first Italian industrial and economic development, also affecting the ownership and control of Italian banks. In fact, in line with the unification of the country, one of the primary political objectives was to shift the Italian industry from a regional to a national dimension. In order to do so, a financially underdeveloped economy such as the Italian one needed banks large enough to drive the industrialization by collecting and lending money on a wide scale 73 Indeed, at that time the model was the universal bank and, most important, there was no separation of banking and industry. This fact allowed for a very active market for the corporate control and for wars of bids between banks and industrial companies 84 . Consequently, at the beginning of the 1920s banks and industrial companies were braided in a complex and unnatural way, constantly involved parallel takeovers by which everyone attempted to gain the control of the other 85 .
The shift from a private owned to a largely state owned credit industry
The World War I had many important consequences. The War in fact deeply influenced also the economy, since the industry modified its production and made important efforts in order to comply with the demand of specific goods. In doing so, the industry enlarged its scale and sectors underdeveloped or inexistent until then finally became part of the economy. However, many problems also resulted from the War. Some areas of the country were almost completely destroyed or deeply injured. Moreover, the scale achieved by industries was no more supported by State's orders, since the national debt raised in the same years and the public finances were distressed. Consequently, the industry faced several difficulties, the attempts to reorganize the system implied a reduction of the achieved scale and a consequent growth of unemployment. At the same time, the rate of inflation grew and prices increased 86 . All these circumstances led to the emergence of a strong and spread discontent among the people. In particular, the traditional tools of the liberal economy seemed unable to solve those problems. Such an environment created the conditions for the birth of illiberal ideologies and political parties proposing authoritative solutions for the crisis. This is the summarized background in which the fascist party bore in 1919 and finally took the power in 1922 87 In line with this idea, the interest of «the Nation» was not the sum of the individual interests of those who live in the nation. In other words, for the fascist theorists the economy shouldn't be driven in the interest of individuals but in the interest of the community (i.e. «the Nation»). Coherently with this line of thought, other traits of the fascist government finally became autarchy, State intervention in the economy and industrial planning.
The fascist attitudes towards the economy were also fuelled by the Great Depression started in the United States of America in October 1929. Indeed, the deep contraction of business encouraged the research of new economic models. Moreover, the liberalist methods and ideas lost credibility, being apparently unable to solve or even soften a crisis which was prolonging for years. In that context, the fascism was perceived able to offer a convincing and feasible alternative to the free market economy 89 . The first effect of the crisis of many banks during the Great Depression was to give to the fascist regime the opportunity to take some initiatives that finally led to a wide nationalisation of banks. This process started at the beginning of the 1930s with the creation of IMI and IRI 90 . In addiction, the centrepiece of the reforms addressed to deal with the problems emerged from the Great Depression was the Banking Law enacted in two steps between 1936 and 1938.
The state managers on charge in IMI and IRI can be also considered the architects of the Banking Law of 1936-38 and in this circumstance is possible to find the reasons why this regulation kept its utility and effectiveness for over fifty years. On the other hand, as a consequence of the just described process, the Italian economy became largely controlled by the State. Indeed, as mentioned at the end of the previous paragraph, during the 1920s banks and industrial companies were deeply tangled in the control of each other. Thus, being banks the shareholders of industrial companies, the rescue of distressed banks achieved through their acquisition by IMI and IRI implied that the State also became a large shareholder of many industrial companies. More precisely, after this process, the State totally controlled the production of weapons; the 80-90% of shipyards, shipping-lines, airlines and telephone companies; the 40% of the iron and steel industry; the 30% of the electric industry; the 25% of the mechanical industry and the 15% of the chemical industry 101 .
The gradual retreat of the State from a direct involvement into the economy
The World War II had a destructive impact on the economy. For what especially concern Italy, after 1943 the final and harshest phase of the conflict, being the south occupied by Anglo-American troops, was fought in the central and northern regions (i.e. the industrial heart of the country). During those years, battles and bombardments almost completely destroyed infrastructures, factories and cities. At the end of the World War II Italy was totally ruined from an economic perspective. However, at the same time the war allowed for a deep influence of the Anglo-American culture throughout the country and freed many positive energies. Moreover, in 1946 the result of a referendum repealed the monarchy and established the republic. This vote gave the chance to provide the people's refreshed spirit with a new institutional framework which dismantled many of the previous age-old structures and prerogatives. Moreover, the first initiatives aimed to set a cooperative framework between different European 98 See A. CARDINI, Cultura economica e governo dell"economia nella dittatura fascista, cit., p. 61. 99 Moreover, a confirmation of what described above can be found in an important paper [F. AMATORI 108 The main advantages of such an atomistic system were to be highly dynamic and flexible. Moreover, these small industrial companies, being the modern evolution of traditional workshops, usually produced the typical good of the area in which they were established. Therefore, small companies producing a specific good were concentrated in different areas of the country historically and traditionally renowned for the production of that specific good (e.g.
(but in many cases it still is today) owned by members of a single family who financed it with their personal savings and with profits they reinvested in the business. Being «auto-financed», small companies didn't need any external financial assistance and therefore banks were merely used by families as custodians of savings. Moreover, the galloping economy of 1950s and 1960s also allowed the large industrial groups to be financed only by reinvested profits 109 . In fact, even if the largest industrial companies and banks always remained linked by interlocking directorates 110 , the whole entrepreneurial class of that time was basically autonomous in driving business 111 . Things started to change in the 1970s. Indeed, during the 1960s many opportunities to reform the system were gone lost 112 and, at the beginning of the following decade, the galloping years of the economic boom were definitely ended. In those years, wages were growing and the rate of inflation was increasing in a context of international monetary turmoil and energetic crisis 113 . Under these circumstances, firms (especially the largest ones) could no more rely only on expected profits and their own finances. However, the biggest banks were mainly conceived as commercial banks, thus subjected to rigid controls set by the Banking Law of 1936-38 and unable to help the system. Then, Mediobanca, a semi-private bank chartered at the end of the World War II, gained a prominent role acting as merchant bank 114 . Mediobanca was one of the very few private owned banks at that time but, as already said, it was in fact only semi-private owned. Indeed, it was founded in 1946 by three of the biggest Italian banks which respectively divided among themselves its ownership: Banca Commerciale Italiana 35%, Credito Italiano textiles in Biella and Prato, furniture in Monza). These areas are still called «distretti industriali» (i.e. industrial districts) and played a very important role in the industrialization of Italy. Indeed, the organization in districts accounting several small firms with the same kind of business allowed to develop synergies among them which are able to supply to the lack of economies of scale. See S. BRUSCO 35%, and Banca di Roma 30%. However, these three banks were owned by IRI, thus controlled by the State. Therefore, at the beginning Mediobanca was also owned and controlled (albeit indirectly) by the State. In 1956 Mediobanca was listed on the stock exchange and the three founding banks decreased the amount of shares they held: Banca Commerciale Italiana to 24%, Credito Italiano to 24%, and Banca di Roma to 20%. Consequently, during the 1970s Mediobanca was owned for 32% by private institutions or individuals, but it was still indirectly controlled by the State through the three founding banks mentioned above (collectively holding the 68% of the bank's capital) 115 . Apart from Mediobanca and few other banks, the Italian credit industry was still widely controlled by the State. At the beginning of the 1980s Italy started to emerge from the recession and during that decade the economy grew up again 116 . Notwithstanding the experienced crisis, then Italy was no more a country at the eve of industrialization as it was across the nineteenth and the twentieth century, nor a young and fast-growing economy as it was during the 1950s and 1960s. On the opposite, then Italy was one of the most industrialized countries of the world, a founder and main member of the European Economic Community and an internationally important commercial partner. Moreover, Italy joined the European Monetary System in 1979 117 . In the context shortly described above, the model of banking set during the 1930s entered in crisis. Since the creation of IMI and IRI and the Banking Law of 1936-38, almost any initiative or legislation of great consequence was taken or enacted in Italy concerning the credit industry 118 . At the beginning of the 1980s, the processes of liberalization undertaken by the EEC, as well as Italian market's internal factors, called for the privatization of the credit industry and the development of a more competitive system 119 . The dismantlement of the system settled by the creation of IMI and IRI and the Banking Law of 1936-38 was realised in three steps. Firstly, pressures to comply with the European Directives forced some initial regulatory changes. Secondly, the state ownership of banks was slowly repealed through a process of privatization started with the so called 115 For what concern the first step, the process of privatization occurred in Italy during the 1990s was preceded by a process of regulatory liberalization aimed to cut down entry barriers having legal origin and started to comply with the European Directives enacted in the banking field. The just mentioned elimination of entry barriers was needed because, under the system designed by the Banking Law of 1936-38, new branches could be opened only after a specific authorization granted by the Banca d"Italia. This system prevented from any form of competition, being the authorization granted only in the respect of a planned territorial distribution of branches,.
The mentioned elimination of entry barriers was pursued by the For what concern the second step, the «Legge Amato» started the privatization in 1990 by authorizing the state owned banks to chart private corporations (called «società conferitarie») to which they should transfer their banking activities. At the same time, the state owned banks should chart a fondazione bancaria (also called «ente conferente»). The fondazione bancaria is a particular type of foundation afterwards regulated by the Legislative Decree no. 153/1999 to promote the process of privatization. The aim of these institutions was to own all the shares of società conferitarie, in order to gradually sell them. To pursue at this aim, Section 25 of the Legislative Decree no. 153/1999 stated that every fondazione bancaria should sell all its shares by 31 December 2005 (or at least decrease its participation under a control level). An administrative committee would be settled to dispossess fondazioni bancarie still not complying with this provision at the mentioned deadline. Another intent of the Legislative Decree no. 153/1999 was that, after the shares' dismissal, fondazioni bancarie would continue to exist as mere non profit organizations.
For what concern the third step, the biggest innovation brought by the TUB was the reintroduction of the universal bank (Section 10) and the consequent repeal of the separation between commercial and investment banking. It also set specific provisions about bank's ownership in order to pose limits to the shares of banks that could be owned by industrial companies, without completely prohibiting these participations . More generally, the mentioned law rearranged the system allowing for the existence of only three different kind of banks (Sections 19-37): ordinary banks chartered as corporations and two different kind of banks chartered as cooperatives (banche popolari and banche di credito cooperativo). These provisions formally privatized the system by ordering banks to assume the legal form of private corporations or cooperatives (but they practically remained out of the market as the following paragraph will explain).
In addition, the TUB also designed the supervisory system for the banking sector and charged the Banca d"Italia with its fulfilment. Indeed, the Banca d"Italia is still charged of the following tasks: supervision of the financial and organizational situations of banks and banking groups; prudential control and validation of internal models for the risk measurement; safeguard of intermediaries' sound and prudent management (Sections 51-69) .
Moreover, the TUB provided a specific and detailed discipline of the banking groups (Sections 60-64). Finally, in 1996 the Legislative Decree no. 659/1996 123 introduced in the TUB a new part (Sections 96-96 quater) providing for a system of deposits' insurance.
The final achievement of a (quasi) free market oriented credit industry
At the mid of the 1990s the combined action of «Legge Amato» and TUB formally privatized the Italian credit industry. Banks were formally chartered as private corporations and controlled by private institutions (i.e. fondazioni bancarie). However, despite this formal change, banks were still out of the market. In fact, according to Section 4 of the Legislative Decree no. 153/1999, the majority of each fondazione bancaria's directors should be nominated by local institutions listed by Section 114 of the Constitution (i.e. municipalities, metropolises, provinces, regions). In other words, this provision implied a mere shift in the control of Italian banks from a central level (i.e. the State) to a peripheral level (i.e. local institutions). Under such circumstances, local institutions had incentives to maintain the control over banks through fondazioni bancarie in order to preserve their headquarters within the borders of the local community. Thus, there was the possibility that local institutions would compel fondazioni bancarie to avoid (or at least to delay) the accomplishment with Section 25 of the Legislative Decree no. 153/1999 (which imposed the gradual sell of shares they held).
On the contrary, the majority of fondazioni bancarie gradually complied with above mentioned Section, while a few of them continued to control their società conferitarie. In fact, since the mid of the 1990s until now, the market for the control of banks has been very active in Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena finally mobilized its resources and took the control of Banca Antonveneta (one of the two banks acquired by foreign institutions few months before). Currently, Intesa Sanpaolo and Unicredit Group are two of the largest banks of Europe and they can be both (the second one in particular) substantially considered public companies for what concern their ownership structure. The third largest bank of Italy (Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena) has reached a competitive size at a continental or even global level. Nowadays very few fondazioni bancarie (included that one which controls Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena) continue to keep the control of some banks. However, at this time fondazioni bancarie are part of a system that seems to be effectively competitive, so that they are no more privileged institutions, but normal players forced to drive their businesses as any other one. In sum, apart from some persisting lacks, the Italian banking system seems to have finally took the shape of a free market oriented one and the credit industry can now be considered totally privatized. This is not to say that the Italian model of credit industry can be judged equal, for instance, to the American one or viewed as completely free from political and social influences. Italy, as every country in the world, has its own and persisting peculiarities. Notwithstanding this, it can be definitely said that, if the U.S. credit industry represents the model of a free market oriented system, a large part of the Italian banks is crossing the Atlantic.
Conclusions
Culture and history always matter and, along with path dependencies, they often represent the main obstacles in changing a system of capitalism. As this work tried to explain, culture and history have deeply influenced the way in which the Italian economy has been organized and, more specifically, the ownership and control of the Italian banks.
Since the unification of the country in 1861 and the end of the World War I cultural attitudes towards the economy were deeply marked by liberalism. Moreover, cultural affinities along with political strategies played an important role in shaping the Italian institutional framework in resemblance of the French or the German one. In this period, the Italian credit industry was widely private owned. Later, the social instances which fuelled the rise of fascism pressed for a strong intervention of the State into the economy and the credit industry became almost totally state owned. After the World War II and the fall of fascism, strong liberalistic attitudes towards the economy rose again. Notwithstanding this, the institutional framework settled during twenty years of fascist rule was difficult to dismantle. In addiction, also some of the most culturally similar countries had in that period friendly attitudes towards a certain degree of public intervention into the economy. Thus the Italian economy evolved in the second half of the previous century as a system in which both private and state owned firms coexisted. In this period, the credit industry was still largely state owned. Only few years ago, at the mid of the 1980s, political pressures (i.e. from the EEC), as well as social and economic instances, called for the retreat of the State from the economy. More than twenty years are gone since then and just now the Italian credit industry can be regarded as totally privatized.
